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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960271-CA 
v. : 
BRADLEY C. DAVIS, and : Priority No. 2 
HOLLY H. HYATT, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
INTRODUCTION 
In Point I of their brief, defendants argue that the trial 
court erroneously denied their motion to suppress the evidence 
seized at their residence. In its original brief, the State 
responded that defendants had provided an insufficient record to 
permit a substantive review of the claims because they had not 
included suppression hearing transcripts. 
In response to the State's argument, defendants moved to 
supplement the record with the suppression hearing transcripts. 
This Court granted the motion and allowed the State the 
opportunity to file a supplemental brief addressing Point I on 
the merits. 
In order to avoid any confusion and present its entire 
argument in a single brief, the State submits this Replacement 
Brief in lieu of a supplemental brief. This brief contains a 
merits argument on Point I, states a new standard of review on 
Point III due to an intervening change in the case law, and 
1 
contains a revised fact statement and statement of the case due 
to the additional record. Otherwise, the brief remains the same 
as the original.1 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Bradley C. Davis appeals his convictions for 
possession of cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996); possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (1996); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996); 
and possession of stolen property, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (1995) and 76-6-412 
(Supp. 1995). 
Defendant Holly H. Hyatt appeals her convictions for 
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996); and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996). 
This Court has jurisdiction over both appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (1996). 
xThe State recognizes that this Court's order did not 
specifically permit revisions to arguments other than Point I. 
However, the State has made the changes to the appropriate 
standard of review in Point III in lieu of filing a supplemental 
authority letter pursuant to rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court exceed its discretion when it 
determined that the totality of the circumstances created a 
reasonable suspicion that Davis had violated his probation? 
In reviewing whether the trial court correctly determined 
that the facts created a reasonable suspicion justifying a 
search, this Court must grant "a measure of discretion" to the 
trial court. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny Davis's motion to 
dismiss the possession-of-stolen-property charge where the record 
contains sufficient evidence that someone stole the property? 
This Court must affirm a "denial of a motion to dismiss if, 
upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be 
reasonably drawn from it, [the Court] conclude[s] that some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App.) (citation 
omitted), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
3. Does admitting testimony from one witness about a 
single prior drug transaction with defendants undermine 
confidence in the outcome when a prior witness testified without 
objection to at least fifteen prior drug purchases from 
defendants? 
The appellate courts review trial court rulings on the 
admissibility of prior bad acts evidence with limited deference, 
reviewing closely the trial court's exercise of its discretion. 
3 
State v. Pearson. 323 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah 1997)• 
4. Where the prosecutor relied on evidence of other drug 
transactions to address material issues defendants raised, did he 
so clearly draw the jurors' attention to inappropriate matters 
that the trial court should have sua sponte intervened on 
defendants• behalf? 
In order to establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant 
must show that the prosecutor called to the jurors' attention 
matters they could not consider in reaching their verdict. See, 
e.g.. State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Defendants did not preserve 
this claim; therefore, they must also show that the prosecutor so 
clearly directed the jurors' attention to inappropriate matters 
that the trial court should have intervened on his behalf, and 
that the absence of sua sponte intervention undermines confidence 
in the guilty verdict. Cf. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1223-24 
(Utah 1993) (plainly erroneous prosecutorial misconduct requires* 
error that is obvious and that undermines confidence in the 
outcome). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 
(1996), 58-37a-5 (1996), 76-6-408 (1995), and 76-6-412 (Supp. 
1995); and rules 404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA$g 
In an amended information, the State charged defendant Davis 
with possession of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana with 
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the intent to distribute (Counts I through III respectively); 
possession of drug paraphernalia (Count IV); and possession of 
stolen property (Count V) (Davis R. at 65-64, 224) .2 The State 
charged defendant Hyatt with possession of methamphetamine (Count 
I) and possession of drug paraphernalia (Count II) (Hyatt R. at 
2-1) . 
Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress all of the 
physical evidence seized during the search of their residence and 
automobiles (Davis R. at *7, 105; Hyatt R. at 72, 80). After two 
evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied the motion except as 
to items found in a black bag after the searching officer 
determined that the bag belonged to defendant Hyatt (Davis R. at 
126-25/ Hyatt R. at 99-98) . At the conclusion of each hearing, 
the trial court made detailed oral findings and conclusions 
denying defendants' motion (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 130-35; Tr. 
October 2, 1995 at 280-88) . Transcript pages 130-35 and 280-88 
are attached as addendum B. The trial court also entered 
detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of law (Davis 
R. at 137-29; Hyatt R. at 110-102). A copy of the written 
findings and conclusions is attached as addendum C. 
The jury convicted both defendants as charged (Davis R. at 
270-69; Hyatt R. at 198) . The trial court sentenced Davis to 
consecutive prison terms of one to fifteen years for his 
2The trial court did not number defendants1 pleadings files 
separately. Therefore, the State will identify references to 
Davis's pleading file as "Davis R." and references to Hyatt's as 
"Hyatt R." 
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convictions for possession of methamphetamine and cocaine with 
the intent to distribute; and to concurrent prison terms of zero 
to five years for possession of marijuana with the intent to 
distribute, six months for possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
six months for possession of stolen property (Davis R. at 309-
308) . 
The trial court sentenced Hyatt to a prison term of zero to 
five years and a fine of $5,000 plus an eighty-five percent 
surcharge for her conviction for possession of methamphetamine, 
and to a prison term of six months and a fine of $1,000 plus an 
eighty-five percent surcharge for her conviction for possession 
of drug paraphernalia (Hyatt R. at 247-46). The trial court 
stayed imposition of the prison terms and fines pending 
successful completion of thirty-six months probation on various 
terms (Hyatt R. at 246-45). 
Both defendants timely filed their notices of appeal (Davis 
R. at 312; Hyatt R. at 262) .3 
STATEMENT QF FACT? 
The events leading up to the search at issue began on 
November 15, 1994. On that date, defendant Davis was on 
probation (Davis R. 136). His probation agreement included 
proscriptions against possessing firearms, possessing or using 
controlled substances, knowingly associating with persons 
involved in criminal activity, and engaging in criminal activity 
3Both defendants also filed motions to arrest judgment 
(Davis R. at 285; Hyatt R. at 218). The record contains no 
ruling on those motions. 
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(id. at 154). However, when probation officers Seymour and 
Eckman visited Davis on that date# they observed drug 
paraphernalia and a loaded firearm, and obtained an admission 
from Davis that he had smoked marijuana and used methamphetamine 
(Tr. September 5, 1995 at 67, 70; Davis R. at 135). That visit 
resulted in Davis's arrest and placement on a 72-hour hold (Tr. 
September 5, 1995 at 70). 
The second set of events leading to the challenged search 
began only five days later on November 20, 1994. On uhat 
evening, police officers stopped Mark Milby and Kelly Blackburn 
(Tr. September 5, 1995 at 13; Davis R. at 136) . They arrested 
Milby for possession of methamphetamine and cited Blackburn for 
possession of drug paraphernalia (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 14; 
Davis R. at 136). 
The arresting officers contacted Officer McKell from the 
division of wildlife resources (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 13). 
When Officer McKell examined the truck in which police stopped 
Milby and Blackburn, he found blood and what appeared to be deer 
hair in the back of the truck, on a knife, and on a pair of 
gloves (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 13; Davis R. at 136). After 
police released Blackburn, Blackburn asked Officer McKell to 
telephone Milby's wife (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 15). Officer 
McKell became concerned that the deer and other drugs might be at 
Milby's residence (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 15-16). Consequently, 
Officer McKell contacted Officer Evans of the Iron County police 
department and asked him to monitor Milby1s residence in case 
7 
someone might bring the deer or drugs back to Milby1s house (Tr. 
September 5, 1995 at 15, 22; Davis R. at 136; R. 390). 
At approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer Evans went to Milby1s 
residence on the "back streets" of Summit (Tr. September 5, 1995 
at 23; Davis R. at 136; R. 392). All the lights in the house 
were on, and he saw Blackburn's truck parked in front of the 
house with the engine running (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 23-24; R. 
392-93). After approximately ten minutes, a brown van turned the 
corner (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 24; Davis R. at 136; R. 393). 
The driver began to turn into Milby1s driveway, then, after 
spotting Officer Evans, swerved away from the Milby residence and 
accelerated away at a speed higher than that at which he had 
approached the Milby house (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 24; Davis R. 
at 136, 161; R. 393). 
Officer Evans followed the van to the Summit Truck Stop 
where the van stopped (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 25; Davis R. at 
136; R. 393-94) . He parked behind and sufficiently to the side 
of the van that the driver could have backed out without hitting 
his patrol car (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 31-32, 106; R. 394) . As 
the driver exited the van, he asked the driver to identify 
himself (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 25; R. 394). Davis identified 
himself, and when asked what he was doing, explained that he 
sometimes drove around late at night when he could not sleep (Tr. 
September 5, 1995 at 25-26; Davis R. at 136-35; R. 394). Officer 
Evans did not use his overhead lights to stop Davis, did not 
order Davis out of the van, did not even ask to see Davis's 
8 
driver's license or registration, and never came within touching 
distance of Davis (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 25, 32, 107, 110). 
After this brief encounter, Officer Evans left the truck 
stop, but when Blackburn passed him going the opposite direction 
only moments later, Officer Evans turned around and followed 
Blackburn (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 26; Davis R. at 135; R. 395). 
Blackburn went to the same truck stop, parked next to Davis's 
van, went into the diner, and sat down with Davis (Tr. September 
5, 1995 at 26; Davis R. at 135; R. 395). 
When he returned to work later that day, Officer Evans 
contacted probation officers Eckman and Seymour and told them 
everything that he had observed (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 27-28, 
72-74; Davis R. at 135; R. 395-96). Agents Eckman and Seymour 
suspected that Davis had violated his probation and decided to 
search Davis's home based on: Davis's probation violations 
discovered six days previously; on the information they received 
about Davis going to Milby's house and his contact with 
Blackburn; on Milby's arrest for methamphetamine possession, and 
Blackburn's citation for drug paraphernalia possession only a few 
hours before seeing Davis at Milby's; and on their personal 
knowledge about Milby (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 48-50, 56-58, 74-
75; Davis R. at 135). 
The search uncovered the following items that resulted in 
defendants' convictions: 1) 24.9 grams of methamphetamine; 2) 
1720 milligrams of cocaine; 3) 2,451.5 grams of marijuana; 4) a 
glass pipe with cocaine residue; 5) three different kinds of 
9 
scales that dealers commonly use to weigh drugs for sale; 6) 
baggies commonly used to package drugs for sale; 7) a staple gun 
marked with the name of local company, Goer Manufacturing; and 3) 
a router identified by its owner as one previously stolen from 
his company (Davis R. at 134-33; Hyatt R. at 107-106; R. 649, 
732) . 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Failure to suppress. Defendants contend that the trial 
court should have suppressed the evidence seized. The trial 
court correctly concluded that, as a probationer, Davis had only 
a limited expectation of privacy, and that probation officers 
could search his residence if they reasonably suspected that he 
had violated the terms of his probation. Defendants have not 
argued, let alone established that the trial court exceeded its 
discretion when it determined that the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officers created a reasonable 
suspicion justifying the search. 
2. Motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. Davis contends 
that the trial court erroneously dismissed the possession-of-
stolen-property charge because the record contained no evidence 
that the property, a staple gun and a router, was stolen. 
However, the record contains sufficient evidence that both were 
stolen. The purchasing manager from Goer Manufacturing, the 
owner of the staple gun, testified that the gun had not been 
sold, given away, loaned, or scrapped. The jury could only 
10 
conclude that someone stole the staple gun. The owner of the 
router identified it as a tool that was taken in a burglary. 
3. Other acts evidence. Two witnesses testified about 
their prior drug dealings with defendants. The first stated that 
he had purchased drugs from defendants at least fifteen times. 
Defendants objected to none of his testimony and have not argued 
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. The second 
identified one specific transaction. Defendants objected only to 
his testimony. 
Defendants have not established reversible error in 
admitting the first witness's testimony. Because that witness 
gave more damaging testimony than the second, and the second's 
was merely cumulative, admitting the second witness's testimony 
does not undermine confidence in the outcome. 
4. Prosecutorial misconduct. Defendants accuse the 
prosecutor of misconduct because he purportedly misled the court 
about the purpose for introducing the other acts evidence. 
Defendants contend the prosecutor introduced the evidence solely 
to prejudice the jury against them. However, the prosecutor 
relied on the evidence solely to address issues defendants 
raised: 1) whether Davis intended to distribute the drugs; 2) 
whether Davis knew or should have known that the router and 
staple gun were stolen; and 3) whether Hyatt possessed drugs. 
Therefore, the prosecutor did not draw the jurors' attention to 




DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE 
PROBATION OFFICERS HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT 
DAVIS HAD VIOLATED HIS PROBATION 
Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress all of the 
evidence seized (Davis R. at 97, 105-99; Hyatt R. at 72, 80-74). 
The trial court held two suppression hearings (R. 821, 822) .4 
The trial court made detailed oral findings at the conclusion of 
each hearing and subsequently entered written findings (Tr. 
September 5, 1995 at 130-35; Tr. October 2, 1995 at 280-88; R. 
129-37). After finding that the probation officers reasonably 
suspected that Davis had violated his probation, the trial court 
denied the motion except as to all of the items seized from 
Hyatt's black bag after the searching officer determined that it 
belonged to Hyatt (Tr. October 2, 1995 at 288; R. 129). 
Defendants challenge that ruling on appeal. 
At the time of the search, Davis was on probation (Davis R. 
136). Therefore, Davis had only a diminished privacy interest 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: the 
probation officers could constitutionally search Davis's 
residence once they had a reasonable suspicion that Davis had 
violated a term of his probation. State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 
1069, 1072-74 (Utah 1987); State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254, 
defendants have not raised the primary issue dealt with at 
the second hearing: whether the chain of custody was sufficient 
to permit admitting the evidence. 
12 
1260 (Utah 1983); State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This 
required probation officers to have more than a mere hunch. 
State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d at 1261-62. However, in order to 
search Davis's home, they needed only specific, articulable facts 
that, when considered with legitimate inferences, reasonably 
warranted believing that Davis had violated a condition of his 
probation. State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d at 1072. Determining 
whether the facts known to the officers legitimately raised a 
reasonable suspicion requires looking at the totality of the 
circumstances. See, e.g.. State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 983 
(Utah App. 1992). 
In determining whether the trial court properly denied a 
motion to suppress, this Court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, according the trial court no 
deference. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994). 
However, in reviewing whether the trial court correctly 
determined that the facts created a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the search, this Court must grant "a measure of 
discretion" to the trial court. Id. at 939. 
The trial court applied the correct legal standards when 
determining whether the probation officers justifiably searched 
Davis's home. Specifically, the trial court correctly recognized 
that the search would satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements only 
if the probation officers had an articulable reasonable suspicion 
that Davis had violated a term of his probation (Tr. September 5, 
13 
1995 at 131; Davis R. 131-32). See, e.g.. State v. Johnson. 748 
P.2d at 1072-74; State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209-10. 
Defendants have not argued, let alone established, that the 
trial court exceeded its discretion when it determined that the 
totality of the circumstances known to the probation officers 
created a reasonable suspicion that Davis had violated a 
condition of his probation. Instead, they argue only that: 1) 
meeting with someone (Blackburn) suspected of criminal activity 
does not establish a basis for believing that Davis was engaging 
in criminal activity; 2) Officer Evans had no reasonable 
suspicion to stop Davis in the first place; 3) the probation 
agreement cannot substitute for the reasonable suspicion 
requirement; 4) Hyatt had a full expectation of privacy in the 
entire residence; therefore, the officers could only use evidence 
against her that they obtained either by a warrant or on the 
basis of probable cause; and 5) neither defendant consented to 
the search.5 
Defendants1 first argument distorts both the law and the 
facts. Defendants contend that the officers acted on no more 
than a hunch that Davis had done something illegal because they 
knew only that he had met with someone suspected of criminal 
activity. Appellants' Brief at 11-12. This argument fails for 
two reasons. First, it misstates the law: the officers needed A 
reasonable suspicion only that Davis had violated his probation 
5This argument has no relevance to this case: the State 
never relied on consent to justify the search. 
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terms, not that he was doing something illegal. See, e.g., State 
v. Johnson 748 P.2d at 1072. 
Second, defendants completely ignore most of what the 
officers knew at the time they decided to search defendants1 
residence. Davis's agreement included proscriptions against 
possessing firearms, possessing or using controlled substances, 
knowingly associating with persons involved in criminal activity, 
and engaging in criminal activity (id. at 154). At the time the 
probation officers decided to search Davis's home, they knew the 
following: 1) six days prior to the search, Davis had already 
violated the terms of his probation by possessing drug 
paraphernalia, possessing a firearm, and using marijuana and 
methamphetamine; 2) the evening prior to the search, police 
arrested Milby for possessing methamphetamine, and cited 
Blackburn for possessing drug paraphernalia; 3) the arrest 
triggered an investigation of Milby for possible poaching and 
further drug activities; 4) Milby was a known drug user and 
possibly a dealer; 5) only a few hours after Milby1s arrest and 
in the course of the investigation of him, a police officer saw 
Davis approaching Milby1s home at 2:00 a.m.; 6) at that time, 
Blackburn's truck was parked outside of Milby's house with the 
engine running, and all of the lights were on in Milby's house; 
7) Davis started to pull into Milby's driveway, then turned and 
accelerated away from the home when he saw a police officer 
watching it; 8) the police officer saw Davis meet Blackburn at a 
truck stop a shortly after Davis had aborted his visit to Milby's 
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house (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 131-35; Davis R. 134-36). 
Defendants also have not addressed whether the legitimate 
inferences from these facts support the trial court's conclusion 
that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of a probation 
violation. State v. Johnson 748 P.2d at 1072 (officers may 
consider legitimate inferences from those facts). Only six days 
after the officers found Davis in possession of drug 
paraphernalia and Davis admitted using marijuana and 
methamphetamines, they learned that Davis had gone to Milby1s 
home: a man whom police had arrested only hours before for 
possessing methamphetamines; who was under investigation for 
further drug activities; and whom the officers knew as a drug 
user and possible dealer. Moreover, Davis pulled away from the 
house when he notice a police officer watching him, suggesting 
that he had a less than innocent reason for his visit. Within 
minutes after pulling away from the house, defendant met with 
Blackburn, someone who had likely been at the home when Davis 
approached, and who had been arrested for possessing drug 
paraphernalia with Milby who was in possession of methamphetamine 
at the same time. From this, the probation officers inferred 
that Davis had violated his probation by possessing controlled 
substances and drug paraphernalia (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 48; 
74-75). 
Instead of addressing the correct legal inquiry, the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officers, and the 
legitimate inferences from those circumstances, defendants argue 
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only that Davis's truck stop meeting with Blackburn did not 
create a reasonable suspicion that Davis had broken the law. 
Therefore, they have not established that the trial court 
erroneously found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that Davis had violated any of the probation conditions 
identified above. 
Defendants' second claim, that the trial court should have 
suppressed the evidence because Officer Evans had no reasonable 
suspicion to stop Davis in the first place, is patently 
frivolous. The undisputed facts establish that Officer Evans did 
not stop Davis at all. He parked behind and sufficiently to the 
side of Davis's van that Davis driver could have backed out 
without hitting his patrol car (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 31-32, 
106; R. 394). As Davis exited the van, he asked Davis to 
identify himself (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 25; R. 394). Davis 
did so, and when officer Evans asked what Davis was doing, Davis 
explained that he sometimes drove around late at night when he 
could not sleep (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 25-26; Davis R. at 136-
35; R. 394) . Officer Evans did not use his overhead lights to 
stop Davis, did not order Davis out of the van, did not even ask 
to see Davis's driver's license or registration, and was never 
within touching distance of Davis (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 25, 
32, 107, 110). Based on this undisputed evidence, the trial 
court correctly concluded that Evans' initial encounter with 
Davis constituted only a level one encounter. See, e.g.. State 
v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(level one encounter 
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where officers followed defendants to where they parked their 
truck, defendants crossed street at officers1 request, and. 
officers asked for identification); Bountiful City v. Maestas. 
788 P.2d 1062, 1063-64 (Utah App. 1990)(pulling alongside 
defendant's car and asking for identification is a level one 
encounter). A level one encounter triggers no Fourth Amendment 
protections; therefore, Officer Evans could talk to Davis without 
reasonable suspicion or any suspicion at all. Id.6 
Defendants also erroneously challenge the trial court's 
decision by contending that the probation agreement cannot 
substitute for the reasonable suspicion requirement. The 
argument suggests that the probation agreement permitted searches 
on less than reasonable suspicion and that the trial court relied 
on that agreement to uphold the search. The record does not 
support either conclusion. Although the probation agreement 
contained a handwritten provision allowing searches "as deemed 
appropriate" by Adult Probation and Parole, the printed portions 
defendants erroneously contend that the facts of this case 
are "almost identical" to those in State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 
(Utah 1986), where the Utah Supreme Court concluded that police 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants. In 
Carpena, "a police officer patrolling a neighborhood in which a 
rash of burglaries had recently occurred observed at 3:00 a.m. a 
slowly moving automobile with Arizona plates." Id. at 675. The 
court noted that police had received no reports of any burglaries 
that night. Id. 
Unlike the defendants in Carpena. Davis was not just driving 
slowly in Milby's neighborhood. He was apparently headed 
directly for Milby's house only a few hours after Milby's arrest 
for methamphetamine possession and while police were watching 
Milby's house for further drug activities. When he saw a 
policeman watching the house, he veered away and accelerated down 
the street. 
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of the agreement precluded searches unless supported by 
reasonable suspicion (Davis R. at 154). In any event, the trial 
court relied on its determination that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to search and not on any arguable blanket 
consent to search (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 131; Davis R. at 
130) . 
Finally, Hyatt contends that she had a full expectation of 
privacy in the entire residence and that the search was invalid 
as to her because the officers did not have a warrant or probable 
cause. Hyatt ignores the trial court's finding that she had a 
lower expectation of privacy because she had lived with Davis for 
two and one-half years, knew he was on probation, and knew he had 
consented to searches as a term of his probation. She has not 
argued let alone provided any analysis or authority to establish 
any error in this determination. See, e.g.. State v. Amicone. 
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of 
the defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant 
failed to provide any supporting legal analysis or authority). 
Furthermore, the argument is patently frivolous: a non-
probationer living with a probationer has a reduced expectation 
of privacy and impliedly consents to searches of the areas over 
which they have common authority on the same conditions for which 
officers may search the probationer's property. See State v. 
Johnson. 748 P.2d at 1073-74 (applying this principle to those 
living with parolees). Officers found the methamphetamine on 
which the State ultimately relied to convict Hyatt in a diaper 
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bag found in a Blue Escort parked on defendants1 property (R. 
500). Hyatt has not argued that she exercised exclusive control 
over the Escort or the diaper bag; therefore, she has not shown 
that she had a fully protected expectation of privacy in the car 
or its contents• 
In sum, defendants arguments do not address the critical 
inquiry in this case: whether the trial court exceeded its 
discretion when it concluded the that totality of the 
circumstances know to the probation officers, combined with 
reasonable inferences, created a reasonable suspicion that Dais 
had violated his probation. Therefore, they have established no 
error in that determination. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DAVIS'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS THE POSSESSION-OF-STOLEN-PROPERTY CHARGE 
BECAUSE THE OWNERS OF THE STOLEN PROPERTY TESTIFIED IT 
HAD BEEN STOLEN 
Davis moved to dismiss the possession-of-stolen-property 
charge against him, claiming that the State produced insufficient 
evidence to establish either that the staple gun and router were 
stolen or that he knew they were stolen (R. 740-44). He repeats 
only the former argument on appeal. 
This Court must affirm a "denial of a motion to dismiss if, 
upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be 
reasonably drawn from it, [the Court] conclude[s] that some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App.) (citation 
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omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
The record contains ample evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that the staple gun and router were stolen. The staple 
gun had the name of a local company, Goer Manufacturing, etched 
into it. Kurt Grandy, Goer's purchasing manager, identified the 
staple gun as one belonging to his company (R. 721-22). He also 
testified that his company never sold or gave away its tools, and 
that it had not loaned the staple gun (R. 722, 729). Although he 
admitted that the company scrapped worn out tools, he also 
testified that the company would not have not scrapped the staple 
gun because it appeared to be in good condition (R. 726, 728). 
If Goer did not sell the staple gun, give it away, loan it to 
anyone, or scrap it, the jury could only conclude that someone 
had stolen it. 
Mr. Jeff Middleton testified that someone burglarized his 
business and stole several tools, including the router found at 
Davis's home (R. 732). 
Contrary to Davis's assertion, the evidence clearly 
established that both the router and the staple gun were stolen. 
Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss 
the possession-of-stolen-property charge on Davis's claim that 
the evidence failed to establish that the property was stolen. 
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POINT XXI 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT OBJECT TO THE FIRST WITNESSfS 
TESTIMONY ABOUT THEIR OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS, AND, BECAUSE 
THE SECOND WITNESS'S TESTIMONY WAS MERELY CUMULATIVE 
AND FAR LESS DAMAGING, ADMITTING IT DOES NOT UNDERMINE 
CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME 
Defendant contends that the trial court should not have 
allowed two of the State's witnesses to testify about defendants' 
drug sales to them because neither "had anything to testify to 
which would assist the jury to determine whether or not defendant 
had possessed any controlled substances with the intent to 
distribute • . . •" Appellant's Brief at 20. Defendants' fail 
to establish that the trial court erroneously admitted the 
testimony. Defendant never objected to the first witness's 
testimony and has not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances to excuse his procedural default. The second 
witness gave testimony cumulative to the first's; therefore, 
admitting it does not undermine confidence in the outcome. 
At trial, Davis challenged his intent to distribute the 
drugs and whether he knew or should have known that the staple 
gun and router were stolen. The State's expert testified that 
the quantities of drugs found, their packaging, the paraphernalia 
(scales and baggies) found, and finding the paraphernalia in 
proximity to the drugs established that Davis possessed the drugs 
with the intent to distribute them (R. 645-56). On cross-
examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that some of the 
drug quantities and packaging, and that some of the individual 
items in evidence were consistent with personal use (R. 659-61). 
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He also elicited testimony to suggest generally that Davis did 
not sell drugs. For example, he elicited testimony that: 1) the 
officers did not find customer "owe sheets;" 2) they did not find 
large quantities of cash; 3) Davis lived in a small, old, run-
down home; and 4) the cars on the property were old (R. 668-71). 
Davis also moved to dismiss the receipt-of-stolen-property 
charge, contending, in part, that the evidence failed to 
establish that Davis knew or should have known that the router 
and staple gun were stolen (R. 740-44). 
Hyatt challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
establish that she possessed any of the drugs seized. Hyatt 
contended that the State's possession charge against her rested 
solely on the methamphetamine found in her purse (R. 499). When 
the trial court suppressed the methamphetamine found in the purse 
(R. 498), Hyatt moved to dismiss the possession charge against 
her, contending that no evidence showed she possessed any of the 
other drugs seized (R. 499).7 
Defendants relied on all of these theories in their closing 
argument (R. 773, 775-77, 794-98) 
The State introduced testimony from two witnesses to address 
these issues. The first, Daniel Balduck, testified that he had 
known both defendants for approximately two years, that he went 
to their house on November 21, 1994, to purchase methamphetamine, 
7The State opposed the motion, contending that the jury 
could also convict her for possession of methamphetamine based on 
the methamphetamine in the diaper bag found in the Escort (R. 
500) . 
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and that he had purchased or traded property for methamphetamine 
on at least fifteen occasions prior to that date (R. 680-81). He 
testified that he had purchased drugs from Hyatt alone "a few 
times" (R. 684) . Mr. Balduck also testified that he traded 
stolen property for drugs (R. 681). Defendants objected to none 
of this testimony. 
The second, Blake Bentley, could only testify about a single 
specific transaction in March 1995 (R. 705).8 Defendants 
objected to his testimony, claiming that the State had not 
charged them with what they had done in the past, and that rule 
403 precluded admitting it because it would confuse the jury (R. 
702-703). The prosecutor countered that the testimony helped to 
establish intent (R. 703).9 The trial court allowed the 
testimony. 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor relied on Mr. 
Balduck1s testimony to establish that Davis intended to 
8At one point, Bentley also testified that he purchased from 
Davis and Hyatt in November 1994 (R. 703). Later, however, he 
testified that he could not remember if he purchased from Davis 
during that time because he was dealing with someone else (R. 
706). The only specific transaction he could identify was the 
March 1995 sale (R. 705). 
*He also stated that it established lack of mistake, 
identity, and modus operandi (id.). In their fact statement, 
defendants contend that they never raised these issues, 
Appellants1 Brief at 8, and their statement of the issues 
suggests that the trial court erroneously admitted the evidence 
to establish identity, Appellants' Brief at 2. However, they 
never raise this contention in their argument. In any event, the 
State never actually relied on Balduck1s and Bentley's testimony 
to establish lack of mistake, identity, and modus operandi. The 
prosecutor relied on their testimony to establish Davis's mental 
state for the drug and possession of stolen property charges, and 
to establish that Hyatt possessed methamphetamine. 
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distribute the drugs and knew or should have known the router and 
staple gun were stolen (R. 764-65). He relied on both Mr. 
Balduck's and Mr. Bentley's testimony to establish that Hyatt had 
possession of the drugs (R. 766). 
Defendants contend that neither witness had any relevant 
evidence to provide; therefore, the trial court should not have 
admitted their testimony. Appellants Brief at 20. Rules 403 
and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, govern when the trial court 
may admit evidence of a defendant's other acts. Rule 404(b) 
prohibits using defendants' other acts to suggest that they 
committed the charged crimes merely because they had committed 
other bad acts. Utah R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 
484, 490-91 (Utah 1997). However, the trial court could admit 
the evidence to prove other issues if: 1) the other acts evidence 
is necessary; 2) it is highly probative of a material issue; and 
3) its special probativeness and its necessity outweigh the 
potential for prejudice. Id. at 491. 
Evidence admissible under rule 404(b) must also pass the 
admissibility requirements of rule 403. See, e.g.. State v. 
Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988). Therefore, a trial 
court may admit rule 404(b) evidence only where its potential for 
unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative 
value. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
In addition to showing inadmissibility under both rules 
404(b) and 403, defendants must establish that admitting the 
evidence undermines confidence in the outcome before they can 
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obtain reversal on this basis. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 
424, 427-31 (Utah 1989). 
Defendants did not object to Mr. Balduck1s testimony and 
have not argued plain error in admitting it or argued that other 
exceptional circumstances excuse their procedural default. 
Therefore, they have failed to establish that admitting it 
requires reversal. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 
1992) .10 
The failure to establish reversible error in admitting Mr. 
Balduck1s testimony renders any error in admitting Mr. Bentley1s 
testimony harmless. Mr. Bentley testified about a single drug 
transaction with defendants (R. 705). Mr. Balduck, on the other 
hand, had already testified that he went to defendants1 home to 
purchase drugs the night of the search, that he had purchased 
drugs from defendants on at least fifteen prior occasions, that 
he had purchased drugs from both defendants, and that he had 
traded stolen property for the drugs (R. 680-84) . By the time 
Mr. Bentley testified, Mr. Balduck had already provided much more 
10Defendants did object to Balduckfs testimony in their 
motions to arrest judgment (Davis R. at 285, 291-87; Hyatt R. at 
218, 224-20) . Defendants never clearly state whether they rely 
on the motions to preserve their appellate challenge to Mr. 
Balduck1s testimony, and they have not complied with the 
appellate rule requiring them to identify where they preserved 
this issue. Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (5) (A) . 
In any event, raising the objection in their motions to 
arrest judgment, where the trial court never ruled on the merits 
of that motion, fails to satisfy their obligation to object 
timely. State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1160-61 (Utah 1991). 
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damaging evidence, and defendants neither objected to it at trial 
nor have established a basis for reversing it on appeal. 
Therefore, Mr. Bentley1s testimony does not undermine confidence 
in the outcome, and this Court need not consider whether the 
trial court properly admitted it. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 240 (Utah 1991) (upholding the defendant's conviction 
because he failed to establish prejudice without considering 
whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the 
defendant's other crimes). 
Defendants also have not argued how admission of Mr. 
Balduck's and Mr. Bentley's testimony generally undermines 
confidence in the outcome when considered in light of the other 
evidence introduced. State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d at 431 
(finding the admission of other acts evidence erroneous, but 
affirming because there was no reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result without the evidence). Defendants' failure even 
to argue this crucial element independently defeats their claim. 
In sum, defendants have not established that admitting Mr. 
Balduck's and Mr. Bentley's testimony required reversal. They 
neither objected to Mr. Balduck's testimony, nor argued on appeal 
that admitting constituted plain error. Mr. Bentley provided far 
less damaging testimony than Mr. Balduck; therefore, admitting 
his testimony does not undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Finally, they have not shown that, in light of the other evidence 
supporting their convictions, admitting the other acts evidence 
undermines confidence in the outcome. 
27 
POINT IV 
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR RELIED ON THE OTHER ACTS 
EVIDENCE TO ADDRESS ISSUES THAT DEFENDANTS RAISED, 
INTRODUCING THE OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE WAS NOT 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Defendants contend that the prosecutor lied to the court 
about the purpose for admitting the other crimes evidence. 
Defendants rely on a newspaper article quoting the prosecutor to 
say that the other crimes evidence n^was very damaging.,w 
Appellant's Brief at 19. According to defendants, this quote 
established that the prosecutor actually wanted to use the 
testimony to prejudice the jury. 
In order to establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendants 
must show that the prosecutor called to the jurors' attention 
matters they could not consider in reaching their verdict. See. 
e.g.. State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) . Defendants did not preserve 
this claim. Therefore, they must also show that the prosecutor 
so clearly directed the jurors1 attention to inappropriate 
matters that the trial court should have intervened on their 
behalf, and that the absence of sua sponte intervention 
undermines confidence in the guilty verdict. See State v. Dunn. 
850 P.2d 1201, 1223 (Utah 1993) (plainly erroneous prosecutorial 
misconduct requires error that is obvious and that undermines 
confidence in the outcome). 
Defendants have not argued that either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances exist in this case to justify reversal 
based on this unpreserved claim. Therefore, the Court need not 
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consider the merits of this claim. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 
359 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
Moreover, defendants cannot establish plain error on this 
record. First, they base this argument on a statement the 
prosecutor purportedly made to a newspaper reporter. Appellants' 
Brief at 19-20. However, the statement is outside of the record, 
and the Court cannot consider it. See, e.g., State v. Medina, 
738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). 
Second, their argument fails to establish prosecutorial 
misconduct both legally and factually. Defendants contend only 
that the prosecutor lied to the court about his purpose for 
introducing the other acts evidence: they contend that he 
introduced Mr. Balduck's and Mr. Bentley's testimony only to 
prejudice the jury. A prosecutorial misconduct claim depends not 
on nefarious purposes harbored by the prosecutor, but on what he 
does before the jury. A prosecutor is guilty of prosecutorial 
misconduct only when he draws the jury's attention to matters it 
cannot legitimately consider in reaching its verdict. See, e.g.. 
State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d at 852. Even if prosecutor misleads a 
court about his reasons for introducing evidence, if he does not 
use it in a way that taints the verdict, he is not guilty of 
prosecutorial misconduct.11 
uBy making this argument, the State does not intend to 
suggest that a prosecutor may mislead a court. Obviously, the 
ethical rules proscribe such conduct. The State merely argues 
that misleading the court about his purposes for introducing 
evidence does not state a claim for prosecutorial misconduct. 
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In this case, the prosecutor strictly limited his use of the 
testimony to address issues defendants raised. As established in 
the previous argument, Davis challenged his intent to distribute 
and whether he knew or should have known that the router and 
staple gun were stolen. Hyatt challenged whether she possessed 
any of the drugs seized. In his closing arguing, the prosecutor 
strictly limited the purpose for which the jury could use the 
other crimes evidence: the prior drug transactions established 
that Davis possessed the seized drugs with the intent to 
distribute; Mr. Balduck's testimony supported inferring that 
Davis knew or should have knew the personal property was stolen; 
and Hyatt's prior distribution established that she also 
possessed the drugs (R. 764-66). See State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 
694, 699-700 (Utah App. 1993) (prior drug conviction admissible 
to establish intent to distribute), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1993); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 570-71 (Utah App. 
1991) (prior drug conviction admissible to establish constructive 
possession). The prosecutor said nothing that would have 
suggested that the jurors should convict defendants of the 
charged crimes because they had a history of dealing drugs.12 
Because the prosecutor did not direct the jurors' attention 
to inappropriate matters, nothing required the trial court to 
intervene sua sponte and exclude the evidence.13 
12The prosecutor also relied on the other circumstantial 
evidence to support the same inferences (id.). 
13Defendants also contend that, at two prior hearings, Agent 
Eckman failed to identify Mr. Balduck as the person who arrived 
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For the reasons argued above, the State asks that the Court 
affirm defendants' convictions.
 t t 




Assistant Attorney General 
while the police were searching defendants' residence. 
Appellants1 Brief at 20. According to defendants, this failure 
creates a risk that the jury heard perjured testimony. Id. 
Defendants never clearly state whether they include this in their 
prosecutorial misconduct claim or argue it as a separate basis 
for reversal. In any event, they have not included the hearing 
transcripts where Agent Eckman purportedly misidentified Mr. 
Balduck; therefore, they have provided an insufficient record to 
support this claim. State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 
(Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). The current 
record establishes that Mr. Balduck went to defendants1 home to 
purchase methamphetamine (R. 680-81). 
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58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in 
this section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet 
HteoryiC. 1S6S, SM7-7.S, taaeted by I» tttetto Dmt«s. - Lews 1996, dt 333,14 
199*, ch. 333,1 & makes ths set tffocth* an July 1,1995. 
58-37-8* Prohibited acts —Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner, or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute, 
(b; Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is gruilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-8 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-8 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency19 means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user, or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from an> part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through 
(2XaXvii)is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It ia unlawful for any person: 
(i) who ia subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who ia a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or famish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter, or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation ia prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation waa committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter, or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5Xb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (SXaXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(is) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (SXaXi) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
mn*immn penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this sectjon is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
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(b) Where violation of this diapter violate* a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb)» impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to H the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed For violations of this section, this subsection 
supersedes Section 77-18-4. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9Xa) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb). 
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section 
76-3-203.5. 
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(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in food faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub* 
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, eh. US, I % ItTS, eh. IS, 
I 1; 1977, ch. 29,1 S; 1979, ch. IS, I 5; 19S8, 
ch. 14*1 1; 196* ch. 196,1 1; 19T7, c h - 9 1 
I 100; 1987, eh. 190, | 3$ 1968, eh. 96, f 1; 
1989, eh. 50,1 t; 1989, eh. 56,1 1; 1989, eh. 
178,1 1; 1989, eh. 187,1 S; 1989, eh. 101,1 1; 
1990, eh. 161,1 1; 1990, eh. 163,1 t; 1990, 
ch. 16S, I 3; 1991, eh. 80, | 1; 1991, eh. 196, 
I 4; 1991, ch. 368,1 7; 1996, eh. 384,1 L 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1996, added the last 
sentence in Subjection (9Xa) and rewrote Sub-
, (9X4) which read •Nothing in this sec-
tion in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 764-1002." 
Croae-Rarerencee.—Cities and towns, pro-
hibitions of sales of narcotics to minors, | 10* 
847. 
Psychotozk chemical solvents, penalties for 
use or sale, I 76-10-101 et seq. 
Sentencing for felonies, | | 76-3-201, 76-3* 
203, 764-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, II 76-3-201, 
764-204,76-3-301. 
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Defense of agency. 
Distribution. 
--Arranging to distribute, 




Evidence sufficient to show intent to distribute. 
Forgery of prescription. 
Incomplete sale. 
Information. 




Possession of marijuana. 
Production of marijuana. 
Production or manufacture. 
Qualifications of state's 
-Sale.* 
Search and leisure. 
Sentencing. 
«•» jLnnsincement JOT oner oonvsctsOBw 
—Proximity to school 
Sufficiency of evidence. 
—Connection between defendant and 
—Constructive possession, 
—Production of marijuana. 
—Testimony of paid informant 
—Use of marijuana. 
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History: L. 1981, ch. 71,1 4. 
Cross-Rafsrsncsa. —» Expert 
Rules of Evidsnce, Rule 702 at teq. 
58-37a«5. Unlawful acts* 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, kyect, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, ixgect, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advert:-e «nent is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L» 1961, eh. 76,1 6. Cross-Raferencss, — Sentencing for felo-
Msaning of t h i s act." — Ths tsrrn -this nits, H 76-3-201, 764-204, 764-301. 
set" mesne Lsws 1981, ch. 76, H 1 to 6, which Sentencing for misdtmssnors, H 76-3-201, 
enacted H 5S-37*-l to 58-37s-6. 76-3-204,76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS privets rssidsnes providss tew snforesmsnt of-
. ^ firials with prohahls esuss to conduct s sssrch 
I*"1*; . . of tfat premiss*. State « South, 886 P.2d 796 
S e « h and seizure.
 ( U u h ^ A p p i m ) 1
 Although ths plain smsll doctrine providss 
Intent offiosrs probable cause to believe contraband or 
Where ths buyer of dnif paraphernalia only svidsnes of a crime may be found, it doss not 
intended to use the items as evidence in a automatically provide officers with exigent cfc 
subsequent criminal prosecution of ths seller, it cumstancss justifying a warrantless search of a 
wss factually and legally impossibls for the private residence. State v. South, 886 P.2d 796 
defendant to have known that items sold would (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
be used for illegal purposes. State v. Murphy; _.
 a 
674 R2d 1220 (Utah 1983). Cited in State v. Ksits, 866 R2d 686 (Utah 
Search mad seisure» 
Ths smsll of marijuana emanating from a 
Ct App. 1993). 
58-37a-& Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights. 
Drug paraphernalia if subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right 
can exist in it 
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(hr) ia or exceeds $5,000 or if A t offender has previously boon 
convicted of a violation of tibia aeetion, tba offense ia a second degree 
felony. 
(b) InthaeaaeoftiieftofaAlatilaTiaianaarvioaa^tliapana^ are 
preecribed in Section 764-412. 
(6) A parson who violates this aeetion shall make restitution to the utility or 
cable tafeviaion company for tba value of the gaa, electricity, water, sewer, or 
cable television service consumed in violation of this section plus all reaeonaMe 
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this section. 
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs fbr investigation, 
disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and equipment use. 
(6) Criminal prosecution under this aeetion does not affect the right of a 
utility or cable television company to bring a civil action for redress fbr 
damages suffered aa a result of the commission of any of the acta prohibited by 
this section. 
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy 
otherwise available to a utility or cable television company. 
mstofFCUKM »»440iJ, enacted by pritdbtt*M&t*^at1k*Kaomii*&*fbk 
L.iaa7,eh.aa,taiiaaa,cfc.aMftiaaQ, Bdbssctfoa «X tew** BuhssrHno (4XsX 
eh.iaO,|l | l iea,ekaai, |UL chs&fint tbi vital rtafM sad ths dssnss of 
Amendment Notes. — Its 1906 smsad- (An**, sad msds s minor s&iistk cha&a* 
mmU sflfcetto Mqr 1,1996, rafattttoted 'taj 
76-6-409.6. U M of telecommunication device to avoid law* 
ful charge for aervice — Penalty* 
(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with the intent to 
avoid the payment of any lawftil charge fbr telecommunication service or with 
the knowledge that it waa to avoid the payment of any lawftil charge Cor 
telecommunication service is guilty ofc 
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication aervice 
ia less than $300 or cannot be ascertained; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor, ifths value of the telecommunication servw 
charge ia or exceeds $300 but is not mora than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication aervice ia 
or exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $6,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication aervice 
ia or exceeds $6,000. 
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an offense under this 
section shall be guilty of a second degree felony upon a second conviction and 
any subsequent conviction. 
mftofjnC.1988,704-4094, enscted by I» tbss $300 or" in Subnotion (lXs) end cheated 
1994, eh. 919, 11* 1999, ek. 991,1 U. ti»Ttimnntmin8ubmc*aoMaXb)thiOQ4i 
Amendment Notes. - Tk* 1996 smsod- (dX 
n n t , sfifetto U*j 1,1996, i&sertsd I s Isss 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Acdon fw 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and servicee aa provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) aa a felony of the second degree if the: 
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(i) Talua of tha property or eerviooe if or exeesde $5,000; 
(ii) property atolan if a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor ia armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the t h ^ 
(for) property ia atolan from the peraon of another; 
(b) aa a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) Tahieofthe property or services is or exceedi $1,000 but ialeaa 
than $5,000; 
(ii) actor haa been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken ia a atalHon, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
ateer, ox, boll, calf, aheap, goat, mule, jack, jenny, twine, or poultry; 
(c) aa a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property etolen ia or 
exceed! $300 but ia leaa than $1,000; or 
(d) aa a claaa B misdemeanor if the value of the property atolan ia leaa 
than $300. 
(2) Any peraon who haa been ixtfuredlqr a violation of Subaection 76*408(1) 
may bring an action against any peraon mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
408(2Xd) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff^ costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
KiftotytC. 1999,794419, tnactadtyL. Aiawfment Ndtas. — Tht 1996 tmaad* 
1979, efc. 199, I 7*4419; 1974, ch. 99,1 1% mnt, dEtetta UMJ I, 1996, taa—md tfat 
1979,eh.49,t It 1977, ah. SO, I 1; 1999, eh. vital aawu&te ia Subnotion (IXaXiX UXbXiX 
79,1 111999, eh. 991,1 14 (1XO, aad (IXdX 
PART5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined, 
(1) A person is guilty erf forgery if, with purpose to defi^ud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he ia facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) altera any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issuee, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person ia existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than waa in Cut the case, or to be a copy of an 
original whan no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, •writing* indudee: 
(a) printing or any other method of recording information, checka, 
tokena, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any 
other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) printing or writing a security, revenue stamp, or any other instru-
ment or writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) printing or writing a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing en interest in or claim against 
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
(3) Forgery ia a felony of the third degree-
76-6-408 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A a L t e l d . - M A a . t e U Unmj CJM. — 82ACJJ.UicaajI IS. 
I 10L &p Nuabers. <— Uue&aj^ 10. 
76-6-40& Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbro-
kers* 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, UHM, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive die owner of i t 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal croperty, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2Xd) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully Vxained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, *n a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Xd), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2Xd), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives19 means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
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(b) "Dttltr* means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
History: C. 1963,794409, enacted by L. 
1971, eh. 196, | 764406; 1979, eh. 71,1 1} 
1993, eh. 101, | !• 
Amendment Kocee. — The 1993 amend-
meat, effective May 3,1993, aobetitated "Sub-
section* for "paragraph* in Subaeetion (2\ sub-
divided Subsection (2Xd), moved "if the value 
given for the property exceeds 320* which was 
formerly m Subsection (2XdXi) to the introduc-
tory language, inserted •picture* in Subsection 
(2XdXhU redesignated former Subsections 
(IXdXi) and 0i) ae Subsections (3) and <4X 
inserted Subsection (5), making a correspond* 
ing designation change, end made stylistic 
changes. 
Cross References. ~ Pawnbrokers and sec-
ondhand dealers, | U-6-1 s t i 





—Concealing stolen property. 








The presumption created in Subsection (2) is 
constitutional whsn read in light off 76-1-603, 
which provides that a presumption means only 
that the iisus of the presumed fact must be 
submitted to the Jury unless its existence is 
clearly negated and that the jury may treat 
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the 
presumed fact, but does not disturb the require-
ment that the presumed fact, like all other 
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State * Mullina, 549 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1976). 
The phrase "believing that it probably has 
been stolsn* in Subsection (1), while not a 
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitution-
ally vague. State v. Plum, 662 R2d 124 (Utah 
1976). 
Applicability; 
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits 
its application to pawnbroker* and similar 
businesses that generally deal in small pur-
chases of secondhand coneumer goods. It does 
not include businesses that regularly dsal in 
large bulk orders of raw industrial material 
Alu Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 346 P2d 1232 (Utah 
19931 
stolen; (2) the defendant aided m ntmrosHng 
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in 
conoeeling it he knew the item had been stolen; 
and (4) his purpose in acting waa to dsprtvs the 
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606 
P.2d 229 (Utah I960). 
—'Receiving stolen property. 
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen 
property are: property belonging to another has 
been stolsn; the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of the stolen property, at the time of 
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property 
the defendant knew or believed the properly 
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely 
to deprive the owner of the possession of the 
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1930). 
Time of the alleged offense is net an essential 
element of the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty, states proof that offense occurred on a 
date different than that alleged in the informa-
tion waa not fatal to defendants conviction for 
receiving stolen property where the applicable 
limitations statute had not run at the time the 
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394 
(Utah 1932). 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by 
receiving, the state must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) The defendant received, retainsd, or die* 
posed of the property of another, (2) knowing 
that the property had been stolen or believing 
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the 
to deprive the owner thereof State v. 
, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1996X 
—Concealing stolen property 
The elements in the crime of concealing or 
aiding in the concealment of etolen property 
are. (1) property belonging to another has been 
Trial court properly found entrapment in a 
"sting* operation involving use of an attractive 
female undercover police officer to sell stolen 
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may 
have been encouraged to euggest that his rale* 
tionship with the officer become more intimate. 
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 466 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
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l988Utah L It?. 717. 
Tht Myittrioot Creation of Staid tad Sal-
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tfaat: A t Utah Example, 1888 Utah L It?. 
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AJJL—AdmiadhOitgr of fdes stress train* 
atton tttt results or of ttattmtats madt durinf 
tset, 47 AXJUth 1202. 
Adaptability tad wtl^ht of evidence of prior 
wrtaidontiflcotton of accused la tormtrtiflo with 
eoouaiasioa of crime similar to that laasoatly 
charged, 60 AUL4th 1049. 
Producta liability: artrnlttiHBty of < 
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1188. 
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euhi ia personal injury sdts, 88 AJJUb 
1108. 
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Products liability: admiasibflity of < 
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tetor vehicle, 84 AXJL4th 125. 
Admissibility, la criminal caste, of tfidtaei 
if tttdnphorodi of dritd tfidaatiai7 bloc* 
Stain*, 88 AUUth 888. 
Admiarfbility, ia prosecutioo fcr sex-rtlttsd 
iffnaa, of rotulta of tatta oa aamaa or anaiail 
ftalds, 78 A U U t h 897. 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed w 
enhanced testimony, 77 AJJtdth 927. 
Admissibility of DNA idaatifieatioB evi> 
40800, 84 AUUth 818. 
Admissibility ia tvidtnot of oompotltt pit* 
too or akotch produced by polios to idcntfy 
t&ader, 28 AULSth 872. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice! confusion! or waste of time. 
Although nlcvtnt, evidence msy be excluded if it* probative vita* it eu6» 
gtantially outweighed by tht danger of unfkir prejudice, confuaion of tht it-
euee, or mialeading tho Jury, or by coneideratione of undue dtUy, wejte of 
time, or ntodltot presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Adviaory Coauaitteo Note. — Thii nxlt io 
the federal rale, verbatim, aad ia substantively 
oooiparahlt to Bale 48, Utah Hales of Evidence 
(1971) except that •turwia^ ia not iaduded aa 
a baaia tot exclusion of relevant evidence. Tht 
change ia laafuaft ia aot oae of substance, 
eiaeo "eurprias" would bo within tho ooaoapt of 
•"unfair prejudice" aa ooataiaed ia Bale 402 
[Bale 4081 See aleo Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Bale 408 indicating that a oootia-
aaaee ia aoet iaataaeeo woold bo a aero aa» 
propriate mathod of daoliaf with •surprised 
See alao Smith v. EsttDt, 448 P. Supp. 847 
(NJD. Tea. 1977) (surprise aae of psychiatric 
testimony ia capital eaat ruled prejudicial cad 
*iolatioa of doe procace). 8eo tho fallowing 
Utah ceeao to the tama effect Tony ?. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst, 808 PJd 814 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 818 fJ2A 1280 (Utsh 
*980); Beietr v. Lohaar, 841 PJd 93 (Utah 
982). 
ompflar's Notea. — The bracketed refcr* 
«aos to "Bole 408" ia the Advisory Committee 
Koto to Bale 408 waa iaaertad because Bale 
d02 dote aot rote to "unfair prejudice* aad 
Sale 408 appeen to bo the correct reference. 
Croat Hstoroaooo. — Adaptability of tvi. 
Balaa of Civil Procedure, Bale 4Ko). 
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Standard of review. 
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l i t balaadag teat o/thit rub eadudei mat-
ter of ooaat or eumulatifo probatiro feroi, 
* t | p d ia by the beola fer the take of it* pr* 
odidal oAct State •. Bartlty, 784 P Jd 1231 
O/tahCt App. 1989). 
Ptychiatric hietory aad drug 
a The right to eroaa-examiae rtfardiat Wat it 
H*itad by thit rult. Stttt v. Hacfcfbrd, 787 
Pv2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
Btcod-eoaked dothtaf* 
After dtftadaat had admitted ^ ^ he 
etahbed tht victim, the trial oourtfo ruliaf to 
Bale 404 UTAH BULBS OF EVIDENCE 864 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admiisible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimen 
(a) Character evidence f eneriHy. Evidenoe of a parson's character or t 
trait of character is sot admissible for the purpoee of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
ofbred by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of Aaracter of 
the victim of the crime offer*! by an accused, or bv the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peaeefulneee of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence thet 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(8) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, ss 
provided in Roles 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimea, wrongs, or acts. Evidsncs of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur* 
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl* 
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Nets. — lfcie rale is 
the federal role, verbatim. Freviaionr of this 
role apply to character evidence to prove 
duet, aa dirtinfniahed from proof < 
where chinriar ie aa warn till element of a 
charfi, claim or defence. Aa to the letter, aae 
Bale 406(b). Bee alao Adviacry Committee 
Note to Rale 404, Federal Balea of Evidence. 
Bale 47, Utah Balea of Evidence (1971) wae 
enmparaWa See alao State v. Say, 673 F.2d 
70S (Utah 1977) (character evidence aa to the 
character of the victim of ehomidda waa ad* 
miaeible to rebut the cWendantfe ooptantfoa 
that tha decaaaad waa tha aggrtaaor). Oae eif* 
nifieant difference betwaaa thia rale aad Bale 
47, Utah Balea of Evidence (1971) ia that there 
ia ao provision tar tha aaa of character evideaee 
ia dvil eeaee, except where character ia tha 
ahimate iaaae ia epeetion, whereea Bale 47 
authorised the aae of character evideaee ia 
dvil eaaaa act eair ea the ahimate iaaae bat 
where etherwiee enhetantively televaat Set 
Boyee, Character Bvideaee: The Subrtentift 
Uee, 4Utah Bar J. IS, 18-19 0976). Howtre?, 
Bale 46, Utah Balea of Evideaee (1971) e* 
preorly excluded character evideaee with r> 
apect to e trait aa to care or ikilL The Advieory 
Committee to the Federal Baler of Evidence 
eoadaded that the remaining jurtifieatioa to 
the edmiaaioa of character evideaee waa ao m-
rir>««<-«* that character evideaee in cM 
oarer ahoald aot be admitted aalear it war ia 
Sabdiviaioa (b) ia comparable to Sale 86, 
Utah Baler of Evideaee (1971). State v. For-
eytfa, 641 PJd 1173 (Utah 1963). See Beyer, 
Evideaee of Other Crimea or Wronfdoinf, 6 
Utah Bar 3. SI (1977). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, reviaed thir 
rale to make the lanfnafe ftnder-nmtraL 
NOTES TO ^ K S I C N a 
Awflifotlftii of rale* 
Caaracter of aeeaeed. 







Proof of motive* 
crime fcr which defendant ia prneently charged 
sad tried ie not fovemed by thia rale. State v. 
Kerekee, 622 FJd 1161 (Utah 1960). 
Thir rale allowr prior bad act evidence ia e 
criminal trial when it ia offered to ahow any 
element of the alleged crime. Mar bad act eri-
doner ia only excluded if the sole reeaon tt ir 
being offered ia to prove bad character or to 
enow that a perron acted in conformity win 
that cfcaactar. Suta v. ONtfl, M l P-3d 6M 
(Utafc Ct AffJ, tmt dofcd, 889 PJd 585 
(UtahlMBX 
Specific inatancee of 
TCctJaFe character. 
Cited. 
Application of rale. 
Admierfhility of evidence of 
ettexter an eerly rtep in the 
act that eon* 
of the 
Ohsrsdrr of i 
When it beeomer apparent from the evideaee 
thet the defendant ia rejying anon the defence 
<af entrapment, the State murt be allowed to 
Efferent any evidence in impeachment or reba* 
tal that would rhow the defendant*e dirpoaitica 
to commit the crime charged, ifw»im^ y^ prior 
acta of crime or miacondact. State v. 
688 PJd 164 (Utah 1876). 
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Evans, who goes to Summit, who sees and identifies 
Mr. Davis at 2:00 in the morning, and then the November 
15th incident with drug paraphernalia and the 72-hour hold, 
and then Mr. Milby — their information that he was a user 
and seller of narcotics coming from his brother and other 
sources — not probable cause, not a search warrant, but a 
person, under Exhibit 100, who was on probation and who 
based upon reasonable suspicion could be subject to a 
search of his person, his property or his residence — it's 
different than me, it's different than Mr. Stapley or 
Mr. McMullin, who are ~ who are not on probation. We have 
not given up those rights to our freedom to be out and to 
not be in jail. He said, "Don't sentence me to jail for a 
year. Don't lock me up. I will sign away some of my 
rights. I will99 -- "I'll be subjected to a search of my 
person and property and residence on a reasonable 
suspicion.99 And — and there is clearly reasonable 
suspicion, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. With regard to the first 
of the arguments made in the motion to suppress the 
evidence, that being that Officer Evans -- Sergeant Evans 
acted improperly when he contacted Mr. Davis at the 
Sunshine Truck Stop in Summit, the Court is convinced that 
what occurred there was nothing more than a level one 
contact. That the officer simply posed questions to 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis was under no apparent detention or 
any kind of pressure to remain. He answered the questions 
apparently voluntarily. The contact was relatively brief. 
It involved no further intrusion than simply talking to 
Mr. Davis. Under those circumstances, that's exactly what 
the Court of Appeals has determined is a level one 
contact. And Sergeant Evans' contact was appropriate, and 
no evidence should be suppressed as a result of that 
contact. 
With regard to the second issue ~ the more 
serious issue ~ and that's the question of whether or not 
given all the circumstances known to Mr. Eckman and 
Mr. Seymour at the time they made the determination to 
search Mr. Davis' home, they had — possessed sufficient 
information to — to create a reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Davis might be in violation of his probation — and I 
believe that's the correct test. Not whether he had 
committed a new crime, but whether he was in violation of 
his probation. 
What we had is a circumstance apparently where 
Mr. Davis had been found in violation of his probation six 
days earlier. Re was in possession of drug paraphernalia, 
driving the same van that Sergeant Evans observed on the --
on the morning of the 21st. From that, new conditions were 
added formally or informally to Mr. Davis' probation, 
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requiring him to secure all of his weapons. And I believe 
that what is meant by that is that he wasn't permitted to 
carry them around with him loose and readily accessible, 
although I don't know whether Mr. Davis had that explained 
to him or not. But in any case, that was one of the 
conditions that was added. And the other was that he 
report twice a month. 
There was an already existing — a preexisting 
condition that he consent to a search. And that was part 
of the — can I have that exhibit, please? ~ the original 
conditions of probation. That condition was not added, so 
the method of adding the conditions, it seems to me, is — 
is irrelevant. If ~ if the agents had sought to search 
Mr. Davis' home to ~ to determine whether or not he was In 
compliance with all the terms of his probation, they could 
have done so. Under paragraph four, Mr. Davis had already 
agreed that he would not possess or have any -- under his 
control or in his custody or in any premises where he 
resides any explosives, firearms or dangeror« veapo^. It 
seems to me that under the agreement, he already had agreed 
not to possess firearms, so that constituted an additional 
violation on November 15th when his van was searched. 
In any case, the officers already knew that 
there were some problems with supervising Mr. Davis on 
probation. That he had apparently possessed drug 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 


























paraphernalia; possessed a firearm in his van six days 
before they get the information that Mr. Milby, who they 
know is a drug user, at the very least, and may be a drug 
trafficker, has been arrested in possession of drugs, along 
with Mr. Blackburn, who is in possession of paraphernalia, 
down in Washington County. There's evidence that a deer 
has been poached, in Mr. Blackburn's vehicle. That's what 
leads to Sergeant Evans being asked to go to Summit and 
observe the goings-on at Mr. Milby's residence. 
While there, it strikes me as a strange 
coincidence that he sees Mr. Blackburn's vehicle in front 
of the Milby residence, with the vehicle's engine still 
running at 2:00 A.M. in the morning on a snowy night. 
While he's sitting there watching the vehicle, he sees 
this — this light colored van with South Dakota license 
plates round the corner and start to pull into the driveway 
of the Milby residence and then turn away from the Milby 
residence and drive off with what he described as a — an 
increased rate of speed. Although given the snowy 
conditions, it wasn't tremendously accelerating. 
He follows that van over to the Summit Truck 
Stop, identifies Mr. Davis in a very brief encounter and 
then starts back toward the Milby residence and encounters 
Mr. Blackburn on the overpass headed for the Sunshine Truck 
Stop. I mean this has to be within a minute or two — 
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maybe three — of the time that he left the Milby 
residence. And he turns around and follows the Blackburn 
vehicle to the truck stop, where he sees Mr. Blackburn go 
in and — and make contact with Mr. Davis, although it was 
not physical contact. He testified he saw them sit down at 
the same table with him. And then he — then Mr. — the 
sergeant left, which I see no — nothing improper about 
that. 
That's reported to the probation officers, so 
now we have Mr. Seymour and Mr. Eckman aware of the prior 
problems. Aware of the arrest and aware of Milby's 
arrest. They have Mr. Davis apparently going to his house 
at two o'clock in the morning — Mr. Milby's house -- but 
turning away when he sees a law enforcement officer, 
followed immediately by a contact with Mr. Blackburn, who 
had been at the Milby house when Mr. Davis aborted his --
his pulling into the driveway. 
Under those circumstances, it would appear to me 
that the officers were justified in believing that 
Mr. Davis was involved with known drug users and might, in 
fact, be violating his probation; might, in fact, be 
associating with those who are involved in criminal 
activity, which was a violation of his probation, or has 
been convicted of a felony, which is a violation of his 
probation. He might be involved in the possession of 
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firearms or dangerous weapons. And the officers had the 
authority to go and see if he had complied with these two 
conditions. And in addition, you have the possibility that 
he's involved with — in the trafficking of the drugs which 
were -- which were seized earlier. 
It's a strange coincidence that Mr. Milby is 
arrested in possession of drugs, and then Mr. Davis shows 
up at his house at two o'clock in the morning that same 
night or the very next morning. Under those circumstances, 
I think the probation officers would be derelict in their 
duty if they didn't undertake to see what their probation 
officer ~ or their probationer was up to. That's what 
they're there for. And if a probation officer can't go 
check on his probationer and find out what he's doing under 
circumstances like this, then I, for one, would be in favor 
of doing away with probation and just sentencing everybody 
to jail or prison if that's the alternative we've got. 
I'm going to deny the motion to suppress on 
those two grounds. 
Now, that leaves us with the third ground. It's 
12:25. We're going to recess this matter to a future date 
and hear the remaining evidence on the matter. As for a 
date, I don't know what you want to do. 
MR. BURNS: As quick as possible, Your Honor. 
The only «•- and I don't blame the Court, and — and I do 
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the prelim, I asked if they checked ownership of the car. 
I asked again here today. I've asked all the officers if 
they checked the ownership of the car. Nobody did. I mean 
it's not ~ that's their problem that they didn't do a 
complete investigation. 
MR. BURNS: I guess my point was it's not in any 
memorandum, and it's not in his motion to suppress. I 
mean ~ unless I'm overlooking something. 
Is it, Counsel? 
THE COURT: He'll be in recess for five minutes. 
MR. OLIVER: I'm not sure. 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: We're back in session. It's now 15 
minutes to 6:00. The defendants are present with their 
counsel. As is counsel for the State. 
In this matter, the defendants have moved to 
suppress the evidence seized by the State and which the 
State seeks to introduce at trial, on three grounds. The 
Court has previously ruled on the first of those grounds, 
which was there was no reasonable suspicion to conduct the 
probation search. The Court has found to the contrary. 
The second ground which the defendants assert is that the 
probation search would not justify the search of 
Ms. Hyatt's property in the home. And the third is — give 
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me a moment to look at the file so I can remind myself how 
it's stated. That the evidence was admitted — or cannot 
be admitted without establishing an adequate — adequate 
chain of custody, is the way that point three is stated. 
I'll address that latter point first. 
Rule 901 of the Rules of Evidence deals with the 
question of authentication and identification of exhibits. 
Rule 901 provides as follows. "The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent 
to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims." 
And in paragraph B, it sets out certain 
illustrations. "By way of illustration only, and not by 
way of limitation, the following are examples of 
authentication or identification conforming with the 
requirements of this rule." And then it sets out 10 or so 
examples. Example number one is "Testimony of a witness 
with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it claims 
to be is sufficient to establish authentication and 
identification." Number four, "Distinctive characteristics 
and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal 
patterns or other distinctive characteristics taken in 
conjunction with the circumstances is sufficient to 
establish authentication and identification." 
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In this case, we have a circumstance where 
officers should have marked the exhibits as they collected 
them. It would ha/e been the best way to identify them. 
It would have been the best way to avoid questions as to 
the authenticity of the documents or the — or the 
identification of the items of evidence* That didn't 
happen. That doesn't automatically mean that those items 
of evidence cannot be admitted. It may weaken their 
weight — their convincing force for the trier of fact, but 
it does not mean that they are not admissible. 
In this case, we have peculiar items of 
evidence. A bucket that is meant, I think, to hold 
automatic dishwasher detergent stuffed with marijuana, 
scales, and plastic bags. A green backpack that is faded 
in appearance and sort of distinctive looking, containing 
very distinctive packages wrapped in plastic with black 
tape wrapped around them sort of in a football shape. 
Green sunglass holders and other small items — purses and 
so forth — all collected at the same location. 
The officers who collected them have identified 
them as the objects that they collected and turned over to 
the collect ~ the assembler of the evidence, Officer 
Womack• That is sufficient to establish a foundation for 
the admissibility of those — those items of evidence. And 
as I've said, it will be up to the trier of fact to 
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determine whether or not the items should be relied upon, 
and whether the items are trustworthy. But that's a matter 
that goes to weight and not to admissibility. 
The defendants have also alleged that there's 
been tampering. The Court has heard no evidence that would 
indicate that evidence has been in any way destroyed or 
tampered to the prejudice of the ~- tampered with to the 
prejudice of the defendants. The only possible question of 
tampering arises from Officer Eckman's testimony regarding 
the contents of the Electrasol bucket. He said that he 
thought ~ well, his testimony wavered all over the place 
with regard to that. He first said that he didn't think 
that the bag that the marijuana was in in the bucket was 
blue, but it was because it was dark, and he couldn't tell 
the color. That indicates to the Court that originally he 
thought there was a bag in the bucket with the marijuana in 
it. A few minutes later, he said, "Well, as I recall, it 
wasn't even in a bucket" — Hin a bag, it was loose in the 
bucket." 
I don't know whether Officer Eckman's right or 
wrong and in which instance he's right or wrong. But the 
fact of the matter is he testified that in the bucket was 
found a quantity of marijuana in a bag or not. He doesn't 
recall scales and plastic bags. There's nothing in the 
evidence that would indicate that the contents of that 
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bucket are not those same items. 
Again, I don't think there's been any evidence 
of tampering or destruction of evidence upon which the 
Court can rely. The jury or the trier of fact is going to 
have to determine whether or not it believes — or which of 
Officer Eckman's statements it believes in deciding whether 
or not the evidence inside the bucket is trustworthy. 
So on the issue of chain of custody or 
tampering, I'm going to deny the motion to suppress, it 
appearing that there is sufficient foundation, although 
there may be an issue for the trier of fact at the time of 
trial. 
Which brings us back to the question of whether 
or not in a probation search, the searching officers may 
search property which is determined later not to belong to 
the probationer. 
The facts, as I understand them, are that 
Ms. Hyatt has lived in the same residence with Mr. Davis 
for about three years. That she has some property on the 
premises, including perhaps the blue Escort, which was 
parked in the back of Mr. Davis' property, and apparently 
that black bag which has been identified previously. 
As the Court views — and let me preface this by 
saying I didn't see anything in your memorandum, 
Mr. Oliver, or in the cases you presented, Mr. Burns, that 
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deal with this question of the scope of a search under a 
probation search scenario. 
Is that correct? Do either of you have any 
authority you overlooked? 
MR. BURNS: Yeah. And maybe that's my fault, 
because I didn't take it from his memoranda that he was 
raising that issue. I think the Court has properly framed 
the issue from counsel's argument, but maybe I misread the 
memorandum, and I have not submitted cases. 
THE COURT: Hell, under paragraph six in 
Mr. Oliver's memorandum, it says "One critical distinction 
must be noted here, and that is that Claimant Hyatt was not 
on probation, and a search of her residence and personal 
property must be supported by probable cause and/or a 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. The search of her 
possessions and residence is illegal per se." 
As the Court views it, however, the issue is not 
one of ownership but of expectation of privacy and control 
and access. Ms. Hyatt was living with Mr. Davis, knowing 
that he was on probation. And it's hard for me to believe 
that her expectation of privacy would be the same as 
someone who — a stranger who happened to visit Mr. Davis 
and leave her purse on the couch, which is the scenario in 
the case that Mr. Oliver pointed out. And I still can't 
remember the name. She lived there. She had possessions 
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scattered all around the house. 
Mr. Davis' responsibility was to consent to a 
search of his person, property, residence — anything under 
his control. That was part of his probation agreement. In 
this home, ve have items belonging to him and to her, so 
the issue is not who owns them. I don't think the 
probation officers are obligated to conduct a preliminary 
investigation to determine who owns what items before they 
conduct a search, the issue is did Mr. Davis have access 
and control over the items that the probation officers 
searched. And it appears to me that he did have access and 
control to the blue car. In fact, Ms. Hyatt has so 
testified that he had access the same as she, and, 
therefore, the officers were authorized to search that 
vehicle, because that was within his access and control. 
With regard to the black bag, I must confess 
when I saw it sitting on the table, I thought it was a 
bowling bag, at first. It is an oddly shaped purse. The 
black bag has sort of a shape like a bowling bag with two 
handles, one on each side. I can see how an officer seeing 
that purse might not be sure what it was, especially having 
found or being aware that contraband had been found in an 
Electrasol bucket. And it — and then there's what appears 
to be some sort of a baby bag — that blue and white 
striped bag ~ and a duffel bag — a backpack* 
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Given all the variety of containers that had 
been searched in which drugs and paraphernalia had been 
found, I can see why the officers would thin]; that that 
black bag hanging in the common bathroom in that house 
would need a look* 
That black bag, if it had been identified prior 
to the officer opening it as Ms. Hyatt's, clearly was out 
of bounds, because the officers don't have the authority to 
search her property. But it has to be under circumstances 
where it's clear to them that it's her property or known to 
them that it's her property, otherwise, I think they have 
the authority to open the bag to determine whether it's 
Mr. Davis' property or her property. Once they determine 
that it's her property, they have to stop searching. 
But as I understand the facts here, the officer 
opened the bag, found items in plain view within the top of 
the bag that had Mr. Davis' name on them. Ms. Hyatt has 
testified that there probably were bills and letters and 
credit cards that had his name on them in that bag. The 
officers were then authorized to continue their search 
until they determined whose bag it was. And in the process 
of conducting that search, they found the evidence I have 
before me today, and they found that brown cigarette case 
or change purse or whatever it was that contained certain 
items in it. 
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And I understand Ms. Hyatt — Hyatt is of the 
opinion that that was on the coffee table. And she may be 
right. I don't know. But the only evidence I have before 
me from the officer is that he found that in the top of the 
black bag, and it contained contraband or evidence. 
It was after that, that he determined that, in 
fact, even though there were items of Mr. Davis' in the 
bag, it was Ms. Hyatt's bag. Anything he found after 
making that discovery, he can't — can't be used in court. 
Otherwise, it can be used in court. 
Now, having said that, I'm going to deny the 
motion to suppress as to the items that were collected in 
the Ford Escort, the van, the black purse up to the time 
that the officer became aware that he was looking at 
Ms. Hyatt's purse, the scales and blue duffel bag, which 
apparently were found inside the home. 
The only area where I'm going to grant the 
motion to suppress is any item that was found in that black 
bag after the point where the officer became aware that 
that was Mrs. Hyatt's — Ms. Hyatt's bag. And I don't know 
what item that would be. That's a matter we can explore at 
the time of the trial. 
Is there any question? 
MR. BURNS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: That's the order. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Plaintiff; ) 
vf. ) 
BRADLEY C. DAVIS, ) Criminal Nos. 941501014 
HOLLY H. HYATT, 941501013 
) Judge J. Philip Eves 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court pursuant to a motion to suppress as 
filed by the above-named Defendants on September 5,1995, and, thereafter, on October 3,1995, and 
the above-named Defendants BRADLEY C. DAVIS and HOLLY H. HYATT having appeared on 
both dates together with their attorney of record D. Bruce Oliver, and the State of Utah having 
appeared on both dates by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums, and the Court having 
received testimony and evidence both on September 5,1995, and October 3,1995, and the Court 
having thereafter beard oral arguments from both parties and having reviewed points and authorities 
as submitted by the parties, and being fiifly advised in the premises now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, to wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that on November 21,1994, Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on 
probation from the Sixth District Court, Stute of Utah, and was being supervised by Adult Probation 
and Parole agents in Cedar City, Utah (the location of the Defendant's residence), and that the 
Defendant had consented, as a term and condition of a written probation order, to a search of his 
residence, person, and property upon reasonable suspicion. 
2. The Court finds that on November 20,1994, Mark Milby and Kelly Blackburn were 
arrested in Washington County, State of Utah, after being stopped by a Hurricane City police officer. 
In the vehicle occupied by Mr. Milby and Mr. Blackburn was fresh blood and what appeared to be 
deer hairs. A subsequent investigation led to the arrest of Mr. Milby for possession of 
methamphetamine and a citation being given to Mr. Blackburn for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Moreover, officers were investigating both individuals for a possible violation of unlawful taking of 
protected wildlife. Officer Gary McKell, Division of Wildlife Resources, had knowledge that Kelly 
Blackburn was not incarcerated after the initial arrest and, therefore, contacted law enforcement 
officers in Iron County, State of Utah, and requested that an officer monitor the Mark Milby 
residence located in Summit, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that at approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 21,1994, Sergeant 
Rick Evans of the Iron County Sheriff i Department was parked at the Mark Milby residence, 
pursuant to a request from Officer McKeQ, and observed a brown van approach the Milby residence, 
begin to turn into the Milby driveway, and thereafter swerve away from the Milby residence and 
accelerate away. Sergeant Evans followed the vehicle to the Summit Truck Stop and (a) observed 
a male occupant exh the van, (b) identified the subject as Defendant Bradley C. Davis, and (c) asked 
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the Defendant what he was doing and receiving the reply, "Since my son died, I can't sleep," or 
words to that affect. Mr. Davis was not seized, detained, or arrested at that time. Thereafter, 
Sergeant Evans drove away and a vehicle passed him, believed to be driven by Kelly Blackburn, so 
Sergeant Evans turned around and followed the vehicle back to the Summit Truck Stop where he 
observed KeDy Blackburn, a person known to him, enter the Summit Truck Stop and meet with 
Bradley C. Davis at a booth. 
4. The Court finds that Aduh Probation and Parole AgentsRodney Seymour andRobert 
Eckman were contacted later mat day (November 21,1994) by Sergeant Evans and by Hurricane City 
police officers and informed of the arrest and citation of MUby and Blackburn; the request that 
Sergeant Evans monitor the Milby residence in Summit, Utah; and the fact that Defendant Bradley 
C. Davis met with Kelly Blackburn at approximately 2:00 a.m. at the Summit Truck Stop. 
5. The Court finds that Adult Probation and Parole Agents Seymour and Eckman had 
visited Defendant Bradley C. Davis* residence approximately four (4) days prior to November 21, 
1994, and located drug paraphernalia, a loaded firearm, and further learned, by admissions from 
Defendant Bradley C. Davis, that he had smoked marijuana and used methamphetamine within the 
prior one (1) week. 
6. The Court finds that, based upon the prior vish and search of approximately November 
17,1994, as weO as the information learned from Sergeant Rick Evans and Officer Gary McKell, as 
well as Hurricane City police officers, Agents Seymour and Eckman made a determination to visit 
the residence of Defendant Bradley C. Davis on November 21,1994, and conduct a search for 
controlled substances and paraphernalia. 
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7. The Court finds that on November 21,1994, Agents Seymour and Eckman did, in 
fact, travel to Defendant Bradley C. Davis' residence and a subsequent search revealed numerous 
hems of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances including the foUowing, to wit: 13.5 grams of 
marijuana; 510 milligrams of methamphetamine, 510 milligrams of methamphetamine; 520 milligrams 
of methamphetamine, 1.7 grams of marijuana; 5.0 grams of marijuana; 990 milligrams of cocaine; 730 
milligrams of cocaine; a glass pipe with cocaine residue; 2.9 grams of marijuana; 18.2 grams of 
methamphetamine; drug paraphernalia; 5.2 grams of methamphetamine; 15.9 grams of marijuana; 
portable scales; large scales; 382 gram* of marijuana; 211 grams of marijuana; 198 grams of 
marijuana; 195 grams of marijuana; 199 grams of marijuana; 135 grams of marijuana; 1,106 grams 
of marijuana; and other hems of paraphernalia. 
8. The Court further finds that, within the Bradley C. Davis residence, Cedar City Police 
Officer Jerry Womack observed a "black bag" that resembles a "bowling bag" located in a common 
area of the residence. Officer Womack observed, in looking at the top of the bag, several hems with 
the name "Bradley C. Davis" on said hems, including checks, bills, a letter, credit cards, etc., and 
therefore made a search of the black bag. Inside the bag, Officer Womack located a baggie 
containing methamphetamine, together with a red straw with methamphetamine residue and a metal 
straw with methamphetamine residue. Officer Womack also located additional hems (credit cards, 
driver's license, etc.) that belonged to "Holly Hyatt", thereafter, Officer Womack made a 
determination that the bag and purse, in all likelihood belonged to Defendant HoDy H. Hyatt. 
9. The Court finds that Cedar City Police Officers Jerry Womack and Ken Stapley 
gathered all of the evidence (as identified in paragraph 7 above) and transported said hems to the 
Cedar City Police Department Thereafter, Officers Womack and Stapley made notations of the hems 
- 4 -
seized, identifying each item and weighing some of the items, and thereafter placed the items in the 
evidence locker. Thereafter, Paula Douglas (evidence custodian of the Cedar City Police 
Department) took custody of the items, placed them in a large box, and delivered them to Criminalist 
John Gerlits at the Utah State Crime Lab located in Cedar City, Utah. Criminalist Gerlits marked, 
tested, packaged, and, after analyzing each hem, returned said hems to Paula Douglas at the Cedar 
City Police Department. 
10. The Court finds that, pursuant to the search made by Agents Seymour and Eckman, 
Cedar City Police Lieutenant Gen Miller arrived at the Defendant's residence and located several 
tools (construction tools marked "United States Air Force," "UDOT," etc.) and took possession of 
said tools under the assertion that said hems were stolen or had previously been reported as stolen. 
11. The Court finds that Defendant Bradley C. Davis had access to and control of the 
brown van (the van Defendant Davis was observed driving the previous night by Sergeant Evans) 
and, moreover, Defendant Bradley C. Davis had access to and control of the blue Ford Escort vehicle, 
the residence, and the "black bag" as previously identified herein. 
12. The Court finds that many of the Hems containing controlled substances (located 
within the residence, the blue vehicle, and the van) are unique, easily identifiable, and include an 
"Electrosor bucket, a green backpack, and a white and blue striped diaper bag. The Court further 
finds that there is no evidence of tampering with evidence, or destruction of evidence, by any of the 
officers. The only evidence remotely relating to tampering was the testimony of Agent Eckman who 
appeared to be confused, to some degree about the amount of marijuana in the "Electrosor bucket, 
but his testimony did not rise to the level of supporting a theory that the evidence was tampered with, 
destroyed, or altered in any fashion. 
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13. The Court finds that Defendant Holly H. Hyatt has resided with Defendant Bradley 
C. Davis at the residence searched for approximately two and one-half (214) years and that Defendant 
Holly H Hyatt had knowledge that the Defendant was on probation and, as a term of his probation, 
he had consented to a search of his person, property, and vehicles. The Court further finds that many 
of the hems located (controlled substances and paraphernalia) were found in common areas of the 
residence as well as in two (2) vehicles parked near the residence that both Defendants had access 
to, and control over. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant Bradley C.Davis was on probation, having been convicted of a crime which 
extinguished previously enjoyed constitutionally protected liberty interests for the time that he was 
under the jurisdiction of the Sixth District Court. Permitting offenders to serve all or part of their 
sentences in the community, rather than in prison or jail, places a far greater burden on the State to 
protect public safety and provide sufficient structure to aid in treatment efforts. To meet the difficult 
responsibility of supervising offenders in the community, courts have held that it is reasonable to 
allow frequent searches of offenders and to permit the searches on a more relaxed standard. 
Probation searches further the legitimate penalogical interests by disarming offenders who carry 
weapons, providing greater protection to agents and other officers supervising or arresting offenders, 
and discovering contraband or other evidence of violations of release agreements and/or the law. 
Probable cause requirements, therefore, do not generally apply to probation and parole searches. The 
Fourth Amendment protects probationers only "against unreasonable searches and seizures" 
2. A state's operation of a probation system, like its operation ofa prison or jail, presents 
"special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the normal warrant 
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and probable cause requirement. Probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed 
by a court upon an offender after a verdict of guilt or a plea of guilt. Supervision, therefore, is a 
"special need" of the state permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be 
constitutional if applied to the public at large. 
3. The Fourth Amendment requirement for searches are reduced for probationers as it 
is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation 
and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law. The Fourth Amendment requirement 
for searches of probationers is "an articulable reasonable suspicion.** State v. Johnson. 748 P. 2d 
1069,1072 (Utah 1987). In IfihDSOjk the Court held that "a parole officer may conduct a lawful 
search of a parolee's apartment without a search warrant if the parole officer has a 'reasonable 
ground for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his parole or committed a 
crime.'** It is necessary that a parole officer have an articulable "reasonable suspicion** which requires 
no more than that the agent be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief... that a condition of parole has 
been or is being violated. State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069,1072 (Utah 1987) quoting State v. 
Valasquez. 672 P.2d 1254,1260 (1983); and U.S. v. Scott 678 F.2d 32,35 (CA5 1982). For the 
legal development of the reasonable suspicion standard, S££ Terrv v. Ohio. 392 US1 (1968); Adams 
v. Williams. 407 US143 (1972); and United States v Briynoni.Ponce. 422 US873 (1975). 
Several factors may be considered in determining whether there are reasonable grounds, 
including but not Bmhed to: (\) information provided bv an informant see State v. Valasquez. supra. 
(2) reliability and specificity of the information, Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 US868 (1987); (3) 
reliability of the informant, &£ Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, (4) the probation/parole officer's 
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experience with, and knowledge ot, the offender, 2££ Griffin v. Wisconsin, suprar, and (5) the need 
to verify compliance with the requirements of the conditional release agreement, $££ Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, supra. 
4. Agents Rodney Seyinair and RcbrtEcknianliadreasoriable suspicion, on November 
21, 1994, to bdieve that Defendant Bradley C. Davis was possessing controlled substances or 
paraphernalia, and Ekewise had reasonable suspicion to believe that the Defendant was violating the 
terms of his conditional release. 
5. Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on probation and had consented to a search of his 
residence, property, and person upon reasonable suspicion. 
6. Holly H. Hyatt had a reduced "expectation of privacy" to the subject residence, 
vehicles, and property located within common areas as co-Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on 
probation. 
7. Holly H. Hyatt did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to the "black bag" 
until after Officer Womack had made a determination that the bag belonged to Holly H. Hyatt. 
8. Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that a condition precedent, as relating to 
the introduction of evidence, is satisfied if the evidence is "what its proponent claims it is." While 
Cedar City police officers should have marked the evidence, the fact that they did not mark each item 
does not make the evidence inadmissible. 
9. The evidence at issue was not subject to tampering, destruction, or alteration requiring 
a suppression of said evidence. 
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10. All of the evidence, previously described herein, is admissible with the exception of 
any hems located in the "black bag" after Officer Womack determined that the "black bag" belonged 
to Holly H. Hyatt as opposed to Bradley C. Davis. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to suppress, 
as filed independently by Defendant Holly H. Hyatt and Defendant Bradley C. Davis, should be, and 
hereby is, overruled and denied. 
DATED this ' v "day of October, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ & 
IP EVES (J 
District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, by first-class mail, postage fully 
prepaid, on this / / f t day of October, 1995, to the following, to wit: 
Mr. D. Bruce Oliver, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
180 South 300 West #210 
Salt Lake Chy.UT 84101 
ikA 
Secretary 
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